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THE HOOVER COMMISSION AND TASK FORCE REPORTS ON
LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE
RALPH F. FuCHSt
A. General Nature of the Reportst
The report of the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, popularly known as the Hoover Commission,
on Legal Services and Procedure, dated March, 1955,1 and the report of
the Commission's Task Force on the same subject,2 on which the Com-
mission's report was based, are major landmarks in the literature relating
to the legal work of the Government and to administrative law. The re-
port of the Task Force in particular, as has been pointed out, "contains
the most comprehensive treatment of federal administrative law since the
issuance of the celebrated Report of the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure in 1941" and, whatever one may think of its
recommendations, "seems likely to serve as the catalyst in a new move-
ment for administrative law reform."' Intensive analysis and criticism of
the reports, especially that of the Task Force, are prerequisite to their due
consideration.
The general scope of the two reports is the same. They contain
recommendations with regard to the selection and conduct of government
lawyers and the representation of private parties before agencies. To
conduct a new legal career service within the Government and to carry
on certain coordinating functions with reference to agency procedure,
the reports propose the establishment in the Department of Justice of an
Office of Legal Services and Procedure. The Department's role in the
representation of government agencies before courts would also be
t General Secretary, American Association of University Professors; Professor of
Law, Indiana University (on leave of absence 1955-56).
1 The report of the Commission will be cited hereinafter as H.C. Rept. and that
of the Task Force as T.F. Rept. The numbered recommendations in each report will be
cited simply by number, viz., H.C. Rept. No. 52. Two bills proposed in the Task Force
report will be cited as L.S, Act (Legal Services Act) and Code (Administrative Code).
1. This report is in the form of a pamphlet of 115 pages.
2. The Task Force report is a pamphlet of 442 pages.
3. Bernard Schwartz, Hoover Commissiom Report, 7 AD. L. BULL. 126 (1955).
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enlarged. The establishment of an Administrative Court is recommended,
as is the creation of a corps of hearing commissioners to serve the vari-
ous agencies in formal proceedings, which would be attached to the
proposed Court. Both reports contain recommendations relating to the
procedure of federal agencies and judicial review of agency determina-
tions; but only three members of the Commission4 joined in these recom-
mendations, which differ in important respects from those of the Task
Force. Six of the twelve members of the Commission5 "did not vote"
for this group of Commission recommendations, but agreed that they
might be presented to Congress; one' reserved judgment as a member of
Congress if the recommendations should be actively considered by that
body; one' voted in favor of the recommendations only with reservations;
and one8 dissented from the Commission's report as a whole. The con-
clusions of the Task Force were unanimous except as to the extent of
the jurisdiction of the proposed Administrative Court. The Task Force
report includes drafts of two bills to carry out the bulk of its recom-
mendations calling for legislation, including an Administrative Code that
would replace the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
All in all, the reports review those aspects of the work of the execu-
tive branch of the Government and of the courts in relation to that work,
which are of particular professional concern to lawyers. The Task Force
was composed entirely of lawyers9 and the three Commissioners who went
farthest in supporting its recommendations are also lawyers. The recom-
mendations, therefore, constitute to a large extent a professional judg-
ment on the problems covered and will be looked upon as such by
Congress and the country. The dissenting Commissioner, Congressman
Holifield, states as his over-all criticism that "generally, I believe the
report is too 'legalistic' in its approach to problems of Government organi-
zation and management."'" The governing philosophy of the Task Force
report appears in the statement in its text that "The inore closely that
administrative procedures can be made to conform to judicial procedures,
4. Robert G. Storey and Senators Homer Ferguson and John L. McClellan.
5. Chairman Herbert Hoover, and Messrs. Herbert J. Brownell, Jr., Arthur S.
Flemming, Solomon C. Hollister, Joseph P. Kennedy, and Sidney A. Mitchell.
6. Congressman Clarence J. Brown.
7. James A. Farley.
8. Congressman Chet Holifield.
9. The members of the Task Force were James Marsh Douglas, Chairman, Herbert
Watson Clark, Cody Fowler, Albert J. Harno, James McCauley Landis, Carl McFar-
land, Ross L. Malone, Jr., David F. Maxwell, Harold R. Medina, David W. Peck,
Reginald Heber Smith, E. Blythe Stason, Elbert Parr Tuttle, and Edward Ledwidge
Wright. Mr. Justice Robert H. Jackson, George Roberts, and Chief Justice Arthur T.
Vanderbilt served as special consultants.
10. H.C. Rept., pp. 97-98.
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the greater the probability that justice will be attained in the administrative
process."'"
Unfortunately the report of the Task Force is not accompanied by
Sea separate staff document containing detailed charts and appendices
for the use of the task force and the Commission," which is cited at
various points in the report but "has not been published and is not avail-
able.' '1 2 The reports as issued suffer at numerous points from a lack of
supporting information and at some points from an apparent superficiality
that might diminish if the data used were available. It seems fair to say,
however, that in the main the recommendations and proposed statutory
provisions are logical applications of governing principles, rather than
proposals based on empirical study, and must stand or fall on the asserted
validity of those applications. In characteristic Hoover Commission style,
the Commission report consists of short, dogmatic text passages which
lead to brief black-letter recommendations, 52 in number. The order is
reversed in the Task Force report, with fuller statements following 74
black-letter recommendations. In addition, an over-all General Report,
by way of summary, occupies 51 pages of the first of five Parts into
which the Task Force report is divided; some of the chapters within
each Part have introductory passages; and the two comprehensive statutes
proposed are followed by section-by-section analyses of their provisions.
Considerations counter to those which moved the Task Force and the
Commission are rarely mentioned.
In the treatment that follows, the recommendations and proposed
statutory provisions will be dealt with in the following order: (1) govern-
ment legal personnel and representation of private parties before agencies;
(2) organization of government legal services; (3) the Administrative
Court; (4) hearing commissioners; (5) administrative procedure and
judicial review; and (6) proposed limitations of federal administrative
authority. Over-all comments will be offered in conclusion. Proposals
in the reports with respect to legal services within the Department of
Defense, which involve matters largely unfamiliar to the writer," will
not be discussed, nor will certain other recommendations of limited scope.'4
B. Legal Personnel and Representation
The most important proposal in the reports with respect to legal
personnel-is that government attorneys be placed under a career service
11. T.F. Rept., p. 138. (Italics in original.)
12. Id. at p. viii.
13. These proposals embrace recommendations 7-10 and 18-20 of the Commission
report and recommendations 7-12, 14, and 21-22 of the Task Force report.
14. Notably a recommendation that the Veterans' Administration Guardianship
Service be curtailed. H.C. Rept. No. 5; T.F. Rept., pp. 68-71.
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to be newly established and administered by the Department of Justice.
The need for a career legal service has long been felt. Under the prevailing
practice from the beginning of the Government, except for a four-year
interlude under Executive Order No. 8743 of April 23, 1941 and succeed-
ing Orders, federal attorneys have been outside of the civil-service merit
system and subject to political appointment. Although consideration of
merit in making appointments has been the rule rather than the exception
and considerable security of tenure has existed on an informal basis,
adequate security has not been created, and the Government's efforts to
obtain qualified young lawyers in competition with private employment
have been seriously handicapped by the absence of a suitable system of
recruitment, selection, promotion, and tenure.1"
The 1941 report of the President's Committee on Civil Service
Improvement, 7 which for some reason that is difficult to understand is
not cited in the present reports, recommended the establishment of a legal
service under a merit system and presented two alternative plans in detail.
One of these plans was placed in effect by executive order and continued
with modifications until 1945 when denial of funds by Congress com-
pelled its abandonment." The new recommendations are similar in im-
portant respects to those of the earlier committee; but whereas that com-
mittee suggested placing the specialized career service under the over-all
Civil Service laws with some modification, the present proposal would
govern it by new legislation and place it in an Office of Legal Service
and Procedure in the Department of Justice. It would be under a
director and would function with the aid of a Legal Services Advisory
Committee chosen by the chief law officers of the various agencies. The
Committee, the chairman of which could not be from the Department
of Justice, would have limited veto power over the regulations of the
Office.'9 An informal recruitment plan which has been maintained by
the Department of Justice during the past three years suggested the pro-
posed scheme. "0 In the Department of Defense the plan would operate
15. H.C. Rept. Nos. 11, 12; T.F. Rept. No. 13.
16 H.C. Rept., pp. 16-18; T.F. Rept., pp. 12-15, 85-88. It has been particularly
difficult for federal agencies, having to carry on recruitment separately, to afford con-
sideration for appointment to lawyers and graduating law students located at a distance
from Washington, since selection almost necessarily involves personal interview.
17. H.R. Doc. No. 118, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
18. See Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 CORN.
L. Q. 281, 314 (1955); CO1MMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXEcUTIVE BRANCH OF
THE GOVERNMENT, Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 130-31
(1955).
19. L.S. Act § 202(c).
20. H.C. Rept., p. 18; T.F. Rept., p. 87.
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through a Civilian Legal Personnel Committee2 modeled after similar
committees now existing in the several services, the earliest of which, in
the Department of the Army, stems from the wartime attorney merit
system.
The methods of examination and selection proposed in the reports
and elaborated in the suggested statute are that the written applications
and records of candidates should be screened and that those candidates
found satisfactory on this basis should be personally interviewed and
graded. The use of written tests would not be excluded by the proposed
statute, although it is not contemplated in the reports. Those candidates
rated highest would have their names placed on registers for the several
grades of positions. "  Not more than five names would be certified from
the top of the appropriate register for each vacancy in an employing
agency,23 perhaps subject to some selection of eligibles for certification
according to their possession of specific qualifications for the positions
to be filled. 4 Subject to regulations of the Office of Legal Services and
Procedure, agencies would be permitted to go outside of the registers for
temporary appointments in "emergency or unusual situations" and, "when
especially desired by a department or agency," they might be allowed to
appoint persons of their own selection to positions not in the lowest
grade.2'5 Tenure would be at the discretion of the employing agency
during a three-year qualifying period and thereafter could be terminated
only for cause,26 but subject to possible reductions in force mitigated by
government-wide preference for reemployment to similar positions. 7
Attorney positions subject to the proposed plan would be designated
by the Office, subject to ultimate decision by an Office of Legal Counsel
in the Department of justice if disagreement with the Civil Service
Commission should arise.2'  The positions would be divided into six
salary grades with compensation ranging from $4205 to $17,500 a year. 9
Advancement would be by action of the agencies' chief legal officers,
subject to the regulations of the Office of Legal Services and Procedure.3"
Recruitment of applicants among law schools would be carried on,"
21. H.C. Rept. No. 8; T.F. Rept. No. 14.
22. H.C. Rept., p. 19; T.F. Rept., p. 89.
23. L.S. Act § 201(c) (7).
24. L.S. Act § 201(c) (1).
25. L.S. Act § 201(c) (5). See also T.F. Rept., p. 90.
26. H.C. Rept., pp. 23-24; T.F. Rept., pp. 91-92; L.S. Act § 205(b).
27. T.F. Rept., p. 90; L.S. Act § 201(c) (6).
28. L.S. Act § 203(b).
29. H.C. Rept., p. 22; T.F. Rept., p. 96; L.S. Act § 204(a).
30. T.F. Rept., p. 91; L.S. Act § 204(c).
31. H.C. Rept., p. 18; T.F. Rept., p. 89; L.S. Act § 201(c) (2).
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in-service training to provided,3" and the requirement, otherwise applicable,
of bar membership as a condition of eligibility be waived for a 12-month
period after initial appointment. 3
The substance of the plan thus articulated is well thought-out and
provides for all of the elements of a career service embodying merit
principles, except that the number of applicants for the beginning grade
probably would call for an initial written test to eliminate some and reduce
the volume of subsequent oral interviews, as well as to aid in coordinating
the ratings of geographically-scattered interviewing boards. If it should
be properly administered, the plan ought to work well and produce great
improvement in the recruitment, operation, and morale of the Govern-
ment's legal staffs. It is encouraging to have the endorsement of the
Commission and of the Task Force for a scheme of this type. Several
questions of detail and one fundamental issue arise with regard to the
plan as proposed, however."
No reason is given in the reports for rejection of proposals for rating
candidates on registers of eligibles by categories of excellence instead of
by numerical grades and giving agencies a wider choice among eligibles
than the certification of five for each vacancy would provide. Such pro-
posals have won considerable favor of late.3" The escape provisions of
the proposed statute36 seem loosely drafted and might well operate to
encourage evasion of the proposed merit system in connection with new
appointments. Allowing an official of the Department of Justice to decide
which positions are attorney positions when dispute with the Civil Service
Commission arose would hardly be acceptable outside of legal circles.
Much more important is the objection that arises to having the career
service administered by the Department of Justice. The Attorney Gen-
eral, who would be in charge, is a political officer. The Department
is and will remain one of the chief patronage-dispensing agencies of the
Government in connection with judicial and other appointments, and
there would be constant grave danger of subversion of the merit system
by political influences operating in the Department. The reports are not
explicit on the question whether staff positions in the offices of the
United States Attorneys would be subject to the plan proposed, as they
32. L.S. Act § 201(c) (16).
33. L.S. Act § 206(f).
34. Minor features of the proposed plan, such as those dealing with veterans'
preference and performance rating (H.C. Rept., pp. 24-25; T.F. Rept., pp. 97-100), will
not be discussed here.
35. See Fuchs, supra note 18; COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, Commission Report on Personnel and Civil Service, pp.
61-62; Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 88-89 (1955).
36. See note 25, supra.
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should and apparently would be. The political tradition in connection with
these posts would die hard and might be somehow maintained within
the Department, if the administration of the plan were placed there.
Any operating agency employing lawyers and headed by a politically-
chosen officer would be under a continuing temptation to subvert the
merit system it administered, particularly when it had as large a staff
as does the Department of Justice.
In view of the foregoing considerations, it would be far better to
establish an independent administration under the control of a professional
board, preferably with representation on it of the legal profession
outside of the Government as well as twithin it." The Commission's
Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service, " which reported before
the reports on Legal Services and Procedure were issued, has recom-
mended" that a legal examining system similar to the one established
by Executive Order No. 8743 be established under either the Civil
Service Commission or a Board of Legal Examiners. In the respects in
which it differs from the recommendations in the present reports, this
recommendation of the Task Force on Personnel and Civil Service
affords a better base from which to work.4" It does not, however, go
into many of the other aspects of a career merit system for lawyers,
with which the present reports deal.
The Task Force4' and proposed Code would make provision for up
to one-half of the attorney positions in the top two grades in each
agency to be removed from the career merit system by action of the
President on recommendation of the Office of Legal Services and Pro-
cedure, if these positions were determined to be "administrative positions"
or positions "which involve to a substantial extent the policy making
function." 2 In this recommendation the Task Force follows the reports
on Personnel and Civil Service with respect to non-legal administrative
positions.4 The general problem of identifying positions that are policy
making in a sense which links them to political administration and justi-
fies omitting them from the career service is recognized as difficult of
37. The Commission and the Task Force both recommend such a board in connec-
tion with the personnel system which they propose for hearing commissioners. See H.C.
Rept., p. 90; T.F. Rept., p. 264.
38. See note 35 supra.
39. At p. 132.
40. The present author served as Assistant Secretary and Secretary to the former
Board of Legal Examiners, which this recommendation would in effect restore.
41. T.F. Rept., pp. 90-91.
42. L.S. Act § 203(f).
43. CoMMIssIoN ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT,
Commission Report on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 25-29, No. 1; Task Force Report
on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 1-7 (1955).
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solution." Certainly legal positions present difficulties; for the per-
formance of many legal functions, from the preparation of memoranda
by junior attorneys to ruling on the legality of vital programs and deciding
what issues to litigate, often involves an interweaving of policy with
established law. Whether in the legal hierarchy the line should be drawn
elsewhere then just below the top positions is highly doubtful. The
top positions in cabinet departments and some independent agencies in-
volve participation in the political strategy of the national administration
in addition to strictly professional duties. Everywhere else, including the
general counselship of the independent regulatory agencies, the basic
policy is largely given by statute or by decision higher up and the lawyer's
duties consist of professional service, including the resourceful imple-
menting of policy. If positions that involve only this latter type of work
are to be lumped with positions that are policymaking in the partisan
political sense and withdrawn from the career-service merit system, it is
clear that no formula will separate them from those, differing only in
degree of involvement in policy, that remain subject to the merit system.
The Task Force recommendation provides a mechanism for dealing with
the problem, but it furnishes no guide for operating that mechanism.
No such guide could be furnished, since the separation which is recom-
mended presents a distinction in degree and not in kind. It would be
preferable not to attempt the distinction and to professionalize the entire
legal service under the merit system, excepting only those positions that
require involvement in party politics.
Recommendations of the Commission and the Task Force that full-
time government attorneys should be prohibited from engaging in outside
legal practice except, upon express permission, to handle family legal
matters 5 seem sound, provided adequate pay scales are established and
maintained as recommended. The'Commission's added recommendation
that government lawyers should be prohibited from engaging in busi-
ness activities "which interfere with the performance of their official
duties" is obviously sound as stated; but its administration would
present difficulties. By contrast to these sound recommendations, the
Task Force's "conclusion" that the government attorney "should not
participate in groups of employees which seek advantages with respect to
conditions of employment" seems difficult to sustain. It is based on the
"unique obligations" of the lawyer to his client "which cannot be fulfilled
44. COiMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT,
Commission Report on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 30-31, No. 2; Task Force Re-
port on Personnel and Civil Service, pp. 7-8 (1955).
45. H.C. Rept. No. 17; T.F. Rept. No. 20; Code § 601(b).
46. H.C. Rept. No. 17.
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to the fullest extent if he participates in groups which are formed to seek
advantages from his client by group action."4 There is little relation,
if any, between the duties of an attorney in the Government and the
public interests with which an employee organization might conflict.
The economic aspects and other conditions of the employment of govern-
ment lawyers do not differ from those of other government officers. If
employee organization in government service is useful, as it appears to
be, attorneys should not be deterred from participating in it.
The Commission and Task Force reports contain a well-considered
set of recommendations with regard to the representation of private
parties before federal administrative agencies, which in the Task Force
report is supported by a theory that is highly questionable in one respect.
In addition to a reaffirmation of the right of every person compelled to
appear before an agency to be accompanied by an attorney or other
qualified representative,4" which is extended by the recommendations to
voluntary appearances as well, " the recommendations are as follows:
(1) that attorneys authorized to practice law in any state or territory be
permitted to practice before any federal agency by enrolling there ;5" (2)
that non-lawyer specialists be permitted to represent parties before an
agency in its discretion upon meeting the qualifications established by it,
but that no non-lawyer be permitted to engage in the practice of law
before any agency;51 (3) that statutory standards of conduct be estab-
lished and enforced with respect to both lawyers and non-lawyers who are
permitted to practice before agencies ;52 and (4) that a discipline committee
having authority to investigate complaints against lawyer practitioners
before federal agencies be appointed by the Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. This committee
would have authority to reprimand offenders and the duty to refer in-
stances deemed to require judicial action to the United States District
Courts in the districts where the attorneys involved practiced. These
courts would take disciplinary action as to administrative practice and
notify the courts having further disciplinary authority over the various
bars. Enforcement as to non-lawyers and full disciplinary authority
in their own proceedings would be lodged in the agencies themselves.3
The most important aspects of the system of administrative practice
47. T.F. Rept., p. 103.
48. A.P.A. § 6(a), 60 STAT. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1952).
49. H.C. Rept. No. 21; T.F. Rept. No. 67; Code § 600.
50. H.C. Rept. No. 25; T.F. Rept. No. 71; Code § 602(a).
51. H.C. Rept. No. 27; T.F. Rept. No. 73; Code § 604(a).
52. E.C. Rept. No. 23; T.F. Rept. No. 69; Code § 601(a).
53. H.C. Rept. Nos. 26, 28; T.F. Rept. Nos. 72, 74; Code §§ 603, 604(b).
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before federal agencies that would be changed by the foregoing recom-
mendations are (a) the maintenance of special requirements by certain
agencies, which lawyers as well as non-lawyers must meet; (b) the absence
of any presently-effective disciplinary machinery with respect to members
of state bars who engage in administrative practice in Washington with-
out being admitted to the courts there; and (c) the absence of defined
standards of conduct applicable to non-lawyers, except in a few agencies
which have enunciated them. The proposed discipline committee would
represent a particularly desirable advance. Any proposal to abolish special
requirements for lawyers in certain agencies occasions a considerable
outcry on the ground that these requirements are needed ;5" yet lawyers
master many difficult, specialized problems in the course of a practice,
as well as invoke the aid of specialists when their own knowledge or
skill needs supplementing; and it is arguable that agency practice does not
call for safeguards in addition to general professional responsibility.
Nevertheless, it probably would be wiser to provide that agencies which
can demonstrate to an Office of Legal Services and Procedure or other
over-all authority that their operations are benefited by requiring that
lawyers as well as non-lawyers display specific competence in advance,
may impose special qualifying requirements."
The Commission introduces into its recommendation as to the right
of persons to be represented in agency proceedings the qualification that
this right shall not apply in selective service proceedings before local
boards or in proceedings over "the granting of voluntary benefits by the
Government.""6 The first exception recognizes the informality of proceed-
ings before boards composed of volunteers, who are expected to apply
their own knowledge as well as evidence brought before them. The second
exception is difficult to support. It is true that legal representation may
obstruct an administration of benefits which earnestly seeks to confer
these benefits where authorized by law; but the effort to employ lawyers
is rarely made in such proceedings, and other representatives, such as
agents of veterans' organizations who aid claimants before the Veterans
54. The recommendations would do away with even the examination traditionally
required for lawyers to practice in the Patent Office.
55. Much bungling doubtless continues to be perpetrated by lawyers who do not
realize what is involved in particular matters they are asked to handle. Where an
agency reasonably believes that its operation would be impeded by such bungling or
that its operations would benefit by specific assurance of knowledge relating to the
matters with which it deals, there seems to be inadequate reason to deny it the authority
to maintain a specialized bar. Only three agencies maintain such bars now. T.F. Rept.,
p. 292. The Task Force's argument (T.F. Rept., pp. 305-06) that "it is a distinct
hardship . . . for lawyers to have to comply with the technical requirements of all
agencies" considerably overstates the actual situation.
56. H.C. Rept. No. 21.
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Administration, are in fact welcomed." The line between "voluntary
benefits" and matters of right, moreover, is impossible to draw with
precision. The Task Force is more realistic in its recognition that matters
of importance to the individual, whether denominated matters of right
or not, should be administered with adequate procedural safeguards."
Both the Commission and the Task Force recognize that what con-
stitutes the practice of law, from which non-lawyers are barred, is a matter
for judicial determination. 9 The Commission, which asserts that "the
executive branch of the Government is under obligation to itself and to
the public to take reasonable measures to assure that representation before
its departments and agencies is properly conducted,"6 apparently regards it
as a matter of convenience that the judicial definition of the practice of
law should be followed by the agencies, although the importance of re-
stricting that practice to lawyers is recognized."' The Task Force, by
contrast, enunciates the view that if the Federal Government were to pro-
ceed otherwise than by deferring to state courts in respect to what con-
stitutes the practice of law before federal agencies it would "interfere
with the traditional control by the States of the practice of law" and that
"Federal control of professions would be a serious step toward the
destruction of State sovereignty."62 This view seems exaggerated and
unsound, even when qualified by the concession that federal control might
justifiably be asserted where "the consequence of State action is to com-
pletely defeat the effective functioning of Federal agencies." 3 Practice
before federal agencies is a federal matter and there should be no question
about federal authority to govern it. The exercise of that authority
would in no wise "interfere" with any matter properly subject to state
control or restrict the large areas of practice which unquestionably are of
exclusively state concern. For federal agencies to be compelled to follow
state authority as to activities in which non-lawyers are forbidden to
engage would, moreover, either require the most expansive state views
as to the practice of law to be applied or necessitate the use of different
57. H.C. Rept., p. 42. See T.F. Rept., pp. 313-14.
58. T.F. Rept., pp. 170-71. Cf. pp. 287-88. The Task Force's assertion (T.F.
Rept., p. 287) that Congress intended to provide in the Administrative Procedure Act for
a right of persons to be represented before agencies even when not "compelled" to ap-
pear is unsupported and seems at variance with the apparently careful draftsmanship of
this provision of the act. A.P.A. § 6(a), 60 STAT. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a)-
(1952). Denial of the right of counsel to persons compelled to appear, referred to in
the Task Force report, seems a violation of the act, however.
59. H.C. Rept., p. 34; T.F. Rept., p. 292.
60. H.C. Rept., p. 31.
61. Id. at p. 34.
62. T.F. Rept. p. 290.
63. Ibid.
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criteria for persons from different states. The use of state criteria should
extend just so far as is helpful and no farther, as the proposed Code
would permit."
An additional recommendation of both the Commission and the
Task Force is that no attorney should be permitted to represent private
parties before an agency or a court in any matter as to which he "personally
and in his official capacity dealt with, passed upon, or gained material
information" while previously employed by the Government.65 As the
Task Force report explains, existing conflict-of-interest statutes are un-
satisfactory. The recommendations would place the matter in the domain
of professional ethics, with disciplinary sanctions available for enforce-
ment, where it clearly belongs. The standard of what should bar an
attorney because of previous representation of an opposing party includes
the established judicial criterion with regard to knowledge of facts. 6
Although this standard is sometimes difficult to apply, its purpose is
clear and it can be administered sensibly on a case-by-case basis. The Task
Force report, however, seems to omit an important consideration by
suggesting that a former supervising official should not be barred from
accepting employment in relation to a matter for which he was officially
responsible, where he did not gain actual knowledge concerning it or
personally pass upon it while holding his government position.17 "In-
fluence peddling" by former supervisory officers would virtually be
invited by so restrictive an interpretation. A new statute should, rather,
apply wherever there had been official responsibility for a matter com-
ing before an agency, whether or not there had been personal involve-
ment in it. The word "personally" should, therefore, be stricken from
the proposed Code provision.
C. Organization of Government Legal Services
The Commission and the Task Force agree in recommending that
the Department of Justice become the chief law office of the entire Gov-
ernment to an extent not now true 8 and in proposing important changes
to enable the Department to function effectively in its enlarged capacity.
The specific measures suggested fall under three headings: (1) changes
in the organization of the Department; (2) rendition of legal services
by the Department directly to agencies employing relatively few lawyers;
64. Code § 604(a).
65. H.C. Rept. No. 24. See also T.F. Rept. No. 70; Code § 601(b).
66. Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management Corp., 216
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954) ; Laskey Bros. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 130 F.Supp. 514
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
67. T.F. Rept., p. 303.
68. H.C. Rept. No. 2; T.F. Rept. No. 1.
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and (3) government-wide coordination by the Department of agency
procedures and conduct of litigation. In addition, integration of the
legal staff of each department and agency under a chief legal officer is
recommended, except that in regulatory agencies separate advisory legal
staffs to serve the agency heads would be maintained, so as to separate
this advisory function from the active conduct of agency proceedings.
The reports contain a brief account of the history of the Department
of Justice in relation to the legal work of the Government and of past
efforts to integrate all legal functions, or at least the conduct of all
litigation, under the Department. 9 These efforts have lapsed because of
the sheer multiplicity and magnitude of the tasks to be performed. The
principal question now raised is" whether the new recommendations prom-
ise to lead to organizational structures and procedures adequate to cope
with the difficulties standing in the way of integration and whether, if
so, the character of the reorganized Department of Justice would be
likely to be such as to justify entrusting to it such vast powers as are
recommended in the reports.
Within the Department of Justice, to enable the Attorney General
better to keep in touch with the activities for which he is responsible, the
recommendation is that, in addition to a Deputy Attorney General, who
would aid the Attorney General in all matters, there be created an Assist-
ant Deputy Attorney General for litigation and an Assistant Deputy At-
torney General for Legal Administration."0 All the units of the Depart-
ment except the Office of the Solicitor General, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and an Office of Legal
Counsel would be placed under the direction of one or the other of these
Assistant Deputy Attorneys General. In addition, the reports7' and the
proposed legislation"' contemplate an Office of Legal Counsel, the head
of which would report directly to the Attorney General with reference to
certain matters of inter-agency conflict. In the contemplation of the
Task Force, the proposed Office of Legal Services and Procedure would
be placed under the Assistant Deputy Attorney General for Legal Ad-
ministration.
The idea of dividing the supervision of the several divisions of the
Department of Justice into two parts may be a good one, since it may
facilitate the exercise of responsibility by the Attorney General, assisted
by his Deputy. The attempt to distinguish units of the Department deemed
69. H.C. Rept., pp. 4-5; T.F. Rept., p. 8.
70. H.C. Rept. No. 6; T.F. Rept. No. 2; L.S. Act §§ 100, 101.
71. H.C. Rept. No. 3; T.F, Rept. No. 3.
72. L.S. Act § 103.
73. T.F. Rept., p. 61.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to engage in litigation from those having to do with administration seems
futile, however. The Task Force's own separation" is purely arbitrary,
except as to certain units, such as the Bureau of Prisons, which rarely
engage in litigation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service and
the Office of Alien Property, which the Task Force assigns to the
Assistant Deputy Attorney General for Administration, engage in a
large volume of litigation. The Lands Division and the Internal Security
Division, which are assigned by the Task Force to litigation, have im-
portant administrative functions, out of which their litigation grows.
The assignment of United States Marshals to the Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral for Litigation has only a nominal justification. The validity of the
proposed structure of the Department of'justice is, therefore, that of a
convenient mechanical device rather than the embodiment of a valid
theory. It would seem, also, that the Office of Legal Services and
Procedure, if created and given the functions proposed,7" should report
directly to the Attorney General.
The position taken by the Task Force and the Commission with
respect to the independence of agency legal staffs from the Department
of Justice is that such independence should exist only when specifically
authorized by Congress; that Congress should examine all instances
where it exists without such authorization; and that separate legal staffs
having only a few lawyers should be avoided except where unusual reason
for them is found to exist."6 The Commission recommends that all
litigation on behalf of federal agencies be conducted by the Department
of Justice except when Congress authorizes otherwise.
It seems highly doubtful, as Congressman Holifield points out in his
dissent, 5 that the abolition of small independent legal staffs and the
rendition of service to certain agencies by the Department of Justice
through attorneys on its staff, would produce any more responsible or
effective work than at present. It is true that more highly-paid super-
vision of attorneys might be available in the Department than in most
smaller agencies; but responsibility to the Department of Justice might
entail delays and want of understanding by supervisory personnel that
74. Ibid.
75. H.C. Rept. Nos. 12, 49; T.F. Rept. Nos. 4, 61. These functions, relating to
the proposed attorney merit system and the procedures of agencies throughout the
Government, would not be primarily intra-Departmental and should receive attention
at the top. In the opinion of the present writer they should not be in the Department
at all, but rather in an independent agency that would be able to deal directly with other
agencies on their own level.
76. T.F. Rept., pp. 67-71. See also H.C. Rept. No. 1.
77. H.C. Rept. No. 2.
78. H.C. Rept., p. 100.
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would interfere seriously with the performance of functions reposed by
statute in the agencies. The Task Force and the Commission adduce in
support of their recommendations the theory that legal advice should be
rendered free of client control by sufficient stature and independence on
the part of the lawyer to assure professional responsibility. This theory is
undoubtedly sound; but it seems doubtful that it can be given application
by the method suggested. Integration of the legal staff of each depart-
ment under a single professional head, as also recommended by both the
Commission and the Task Force,"9 is a sound device which, as to
small agencies as well as large, probably should remain the chief reliance
for securing adequate professional responsibility and competence.
Conflicts of legal interpretation among various agencies have led, as
the Task Force points out,80 to litigation in which agencies have opposed
each other and in which the courts have had to determine the issues.
The Commission's recommendation 8 ' would provide an ostensibly volun-
tary means within the Department of Justice to which the agencies might
resort for resolving any such conflicts. The Task Force and the proposed
statute82 would make the use of this means compulsory in many situations
by forbidding any agency to litigate a conflict with another agency in-
volving the "application, construction, or interpretation of any statute"
unless authorized by the Office of Legal Counsel after a request to that
Office to determine the matter. Questions of "general law" would not
be subject to this provision.83 To the extent that the Commission would
place all litigation under the control of the Department, 4 its recommenda-
tions would operate similarly.
There is, of course, every reason for not burdening the courts with
unnecessary litigation between government departments and for eliminat-
ing the apparent unseemliness of the Government's litigating with itself.
Nevertheless it is hardly accurate to say, as the Task Force does, that
"controversies of this kind between agencies can scarcely be more justified
than such controversies between two or more divisions of a large corpora-
tion."8 5 The Federal Government is an immensely more complicated affair
than any corporation, and it is a fact of life that various departments
take different points of view, responsive to conflicts of view among
interests in the community with which they are in touch. Were these
to be litigated between private proponents, no questions would be raised.
79. H.C. Rept. No. 4; T.F. Rept. No. 6.
80. T.F. Rept., pp. 62-64.
81. H.C. Rept. No. 3.
82. T.F. Rept. No. 3; L.S. Act § 103.
83. T.F. Rept., p. 65.
84. Note 77 supra.
85. T.F. Rept., p. 62.
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There is already a control over agency resort to appelllate courts, in the
form of a requirement that the Solicitor General approve all government
appeals.86 The proposals in the reports would apply a similar check as
to trial litigation, at least when a question of statutory interpretation was
at issue among federal agencies. The substituted means of resolving such
conflicts would be the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of
Justice. One must regretfully conclude that such an Office, staffed by
lawyers not chosen in the manner of judges, would hardly be a suitable
tribunal to determine with finality for all practical purposes some of the
most important justiciable controversies that arise. With whatever hard-
ship and occasional embarrassment, it would be better to leave such mat-
ters to the courts to the extent that agreement among agencies cannot
be secured. The suggestion in the reports87 that the Attorney General
summon conferences of agency counsel to effect coordination among
them proposes a much better method of resolving conflicts than com-
pulsion through the Office of Legal Counsel, provided the Attorney
General does not attempt to use these conferences as a means of impairing
the independence of agencies that are supposed to determine their policies
with relative freedom from control by the chief executive.88
D. The Administrative Court
The proposal for an Administrative Court in the Commission and
Task Force reports would establish a trial and not an appellate tribunal. 9
A final sentence in the Commission's recommendation on this subject that
"Congress study and determine" whether certain elements of the court's
jurisdiction should be "original or appellate," is inexplicable in terms of
anything contained elsewhere in either report. Except for this sentence,
the proposal is clearly that the new court assume the jurisdiction of the
present Tax Court together with the original adjudicatory functions of
certain other existing agencies.
Just which agency functions should be transferred to the new court
is a subject of differences of opinion expressed in the reports. The Com-
mission, which made a unanimous recommendation on this subject except
for the dissent of Congressman Holifield, would transfer the jurisdiction
of the Federal Trade Commission to issue cease-and-desist orders under
the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts, together with that of
86. The authority exercised is that of the Attorney General, conferred by R-v.
STAT. § 359 (1875), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 309 (1952). See United States v. Winston,
170 U.S. 522 (1898).
87. H.C. Rept., p. 6; T.F. Rept., p. 60.
88. See Fuchs, supra note 18, at pp. 294-97.
89. H.C. Rept. No. 51; T.F. Rept. Nos. 63-65.
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nine other business regulatory agencies under the latter act,"° and also
the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to issue orders
forbidding unfair labor practices. On the Task Force, twelve of the four-
teen members joined in recommending that the National Labor Relations
Board's"' unfair practice jurisdiction be transferred, and all but five
recommended that the court be given jurisdiction over cases involving
exclusion, deportation, and incidental powers over aliens.92
Under the recommendations the Administrative Court would be
organized into Sections, each dealing with one of the areas of jurisdiction
transferred to the court. One of these Sections would consist of the
members of the present Tax Court.93 All of the judges of the new court
would be transferable among Sections as business might require, and
within Sections might sit in divisions of one or more.94 Commissioners
might also be appointed to conduct hearings and make findings and
recommendations.9"
The judges of the Administrative Court, other than the transferred
judges of the Tax Court, would be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to serve during good behavior. A chief
judge would be designated by the President,9 6 and each Section would have
a presiding judge chosen annually by the members of the Section.9"
The Chief Judge and the presiding judges of the several Sections would
constitute an administrative Council to watch over the business of the
court, review and pass on the rules of the Sections, and exercise specified
authority with respect to hearing commissioners who would serve the
administrative agencies but be attached to the court. 8 The court might
hold hearings throughout the country.99
90. The Commission's report (H.C. Rept., p. 86) refers only, in language bor-
rowed from the Federal Trade Commission Act, to jurisdiction relating to "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices"; but the enumeration
of the agencies whose jurisdiction would be affected and the apparent adoption of the
Task Force's conclusions, which are clear on the point [T.F. Rept., p. 251; Code §
410(a)], indicate that jurisdiction under the Clayton Act is conferred. The Commis-
sion's black-letter recommendation speaks of "limited jurisdiction in the trade regulation
field," as does that of the Task Forte.
91. T.F. Rept., p. 280. One member opposed this recommendation and one neither
favored nor opposed it.
92. T.F. Rept., p. 269. Of the five, three opposed and two neither favored nor
opposed this recommendation. "
93. Code § 400. The Tax Court is not a court at present in the same sense as
other federal tribunals that are called courts. It is in the Treasury Department and its
judges hold office for 12-year terms instead of during good behavior.
94. Id. § 404.
95. Id. § 407.
96. Id. §§ 400, 401.
97. Id. § 404.
98. Id. § 406. See pp. 22-23 infra.
99. Id. § 405 (a).
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The recommendation for an administrative trial court is the latest in
a considerable line of such proposals which has reflected the desire to
infuse judicial methods and standards into administrative processes to
the greatest extent practicable.' The expectation of both the Commission
and the Task Force is that, if the proposed court were established, addi-
tional jurisdiction would be transferred to it from time to time.' The
Task Force also anticipates that "after case law had been accumulated
and experience gained" by the court, "some matters of adjudication
handled by" the court "might be transferred to the courts of general
jurisdiction."' 0' 2
If an administrative court of first instance is to be established as
part of the federal system, the structure and method of administration
proposed in the reports provide an excellent model to follow; for they
supply the ingredients of an efficient tribunal, well geared to the federal
system. The court would be a legislative court, administratively attached
to the judicial branch, like the Court of Claims, the Customs Court, and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.0 3 Its decisions would be
reviewed by the United States Courts of Appeals.0
Only a single minor criticism comes to mind concerning the proposed
organization of the court, and that is that the Tax Section with its
sixteen judges would be overwhelmingly large. The reasons for the
size of the Tax Section obviously are that this is the size of the Tax Court
and that it would be unwise to diminish the number of judges and intro-
duce the use of commissioners, unless and until such altered methods
commended themselves to the judges.'
The central question concerning the proposed court is whether
there is a need for it; and the answer to this question depends, in turn,
on whether a sufficient volume and variety of administrative adjudi-
cations to justify a tribunal of several sections can wisely be trans-
ferred to it. The Tax Court could obviously be joined to the Customs
Court in a new tribunal; but the Commission and the Task Force pre-
100. S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 62-64 (1946).
101. H.C. Rept., p. 87; T.F. Rept., p. 249.
102. T.F. Rept., pp. 249-50.
103. The Task Force report contemplates that the Administrative Court would be
served by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. T.F. Rept., p. 249.
104. Code § 411.
105. The Tax Court sits and renders decisions in divisions consisting of a single
judge, with occasional revision of decisions by the court en banc when the Chief Judge
so determines. The operation of the court has given general satisfaction, but some
difficulty has been experienced in achieving coordination of the decisions of the several
judges. Whether a smaller, more unified tribunal, proceeding on the basis of commis-
sioners' reports, could accomplish improvement, presents a question that only experience
could resolve.
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sumably omitted the latter out of deference to it as an established judicial
body. The Court of Claims could be included too; but the volume and
specialized nature of its business probably justify its continued inde-
pendence. An administrative court formed from among these existing
tribunals would, however, not contain the seeds of the kind of growth
which is envisaged in the reports. Although other areas of non- regulatory
adjudication might be added to its jurisdiction consistently with its
character, such as the determination of employees' compensation claims
and the decision of appeals in old age and survivors insurance and
railroad retirement cases, no argument is made in tre reports for includ-
ing these in the province of the Administrative Court. The transfer of
immigration and deportation jurisdiction, which is of the same general
character because it involves largely fact determination, drew less support
in the Task Force than the other items included and, so far as appears,
drew no support in the Commission. Non-regulatory adjudication does
not appear to be what the Commission and the Task Force are gunning
for. The latter speaks, rather, of "the stage of development of the
regulatory process"'00 that justifies court adjudication and "the adjudica-
tion of matters in special areas of regulation"'0 7 which may be given to
the Administrative Court. The cease-and-desist jurisdiction recommended
for the proposed court appears to be a much more significant indicator
of the probable directions of future enlargement of the court's province
than the Tax Court's adjudicatory function or that of the Customs Court.
The cease-and-desist jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
and the National Labor Relations Board is like other functions of the
regulatory agencies in that it involves the exercise of discretion and the
development of policy. What shall be deemed to constitute unfair methods
of competition and unfair labor practices depends to a substantial extent
on what the administering agencies deem it wise to prohibit in pursuance
of the governing statutory purposes, as does the meaning of "public
convenience and necessity" and "reasonablness" of rates under other
statutes. The agencies are established largely to make such determinations
expertly and wisely through the use of the information and competence
with which it is sought to equip them. To a large extent these determina-
tions are made through adjudicatory decisions. The issue surrounding
the proposed transfer of adjudicatory functions of this variety to an
administrative court is whether a loss of capacity to make the necessary
determinations ably is likely to be involved and, if so, whether that loss
106. T.F. Rept., p. 240.
107. Id. at p. 250.
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is counter-balanced by the increased objectivity which the court is likely
to display.
The issue just stated has been debated back and fourth in the litera-
ture of administrative law.' There probably would be no loss and there
might be considerable gain if certain non-regulatory adjudicative func-
tions, affecting vitally the lives and personal fortunes of individuals and
not too closely bound up with a continuous governmental process like
administration of the old age and survivors insurance system, were
entrusted to an administrative court. Important among these would be
decisions as to the deportation of aliens. Adjudications growing out of
regulatory processes are, however, another matter; for in them the
importance of agency expertness and discretion is high. Not merely
fact determination and application of law to fact are involved, but the
evolution of social, political, and economic policy as well. The policies
applied in such adjudication should grow out of over-all administrative
experience, such as a regulatory agency continuously acquires. A purely
adjudicative agency such as an administrative court, even though its
judges specialize in particular subjects, can gain experience only through
testimony and argument before it. There are strong grounds for con-
cluding that this is not enough. The impact of continuous grappling at
first-hand with the problems the legislature desires to have solved, and
has conferred discretionary authority as an aid in solving, is often
necessary."0 9 Where this is true, the transfer of adjudicatory functions to
a court not subject to this impact would sacrifice vital public interests.
The Task Force report, which supplies the more detailed justification
for the recommended jurisdiction of the proposed administrative court,
does not consider adequately the objection thus raised. It argues, rather,
from an asserted trend toward judicialization of all administrative adjudi-
cation after it has been in effect for some time, and selects the cease-
and-desist type of function for early transfer to the Administrative Court
because of its supposedly drastic character."' A cease-and-desist order
is injunctive in nature and enforceable by contempt process in the courts
of general jurisdiction. The courts are largely bound in such proceedings
by administrative determinations of fact, which thus are similarly con-
clusive upon the respondents. It is hard to see, however, why a sentence
for contempt is more drastic than imprisonment as punishment for viola-
108. See especially Caldwell, A Federal Administrative Court, 84 U. PA. L. Rxv.
966 (1936) ; Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court, 35 MicH. L.
REV. 193, 565 (1936-37).
109. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report 58
(1941).
110. T.F. Rept., p. 245.
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tion of an order after a trial in which the only issue is whether the
order has been violated. On the contrary, it was generally regarded as
a strengthening of the Federal Trade Commission Act when criminal
enforcement was added to civil enforcement proceedings as a means of
effectuating cease-and-desist orders under that act."' Practically speak-
ing, moreover, the application of sanctions to compel observance of ad-
ministrative orders is rare and the significent question concerning the
effect of such orders on respondents relates to the adverse consequences
of obedience to them. On this basis public utility rate orders and the
denial or revocation of licenses far outrank most cease-and-desist orders
in the scale of seriousness. If administrative actions involving adverse
consequences to private interests are candidates on this account for
transfer to an administrative court, the whole gamut of agency functions
requires consideration. This is, in fact, the result to which the Task
Force's argument inescapably leads.
As to the Clayton Act and prevention of unfair methods of com-
petition, the Task Force also .argues that diffusion of enforcement
authority among a number of agencies and present inefficiency in the
conduct of proceedings" 2 should be corrected by consolidating the juris-
diction over such matters in the Administrative Court. It is suggested,
further, that the common law origin of the concept of unfair competition
and continuing jurisdiction of the ordinary courts in antitrust cases
justify the belief that an administrative court would be better qualified
than the agencies to determine Clayton Act and unfair-method-of-compe-
tion cases. This reasoning aside from overlooking the distinction between
common law tribunals and an administrative court, ignores the rudi-
mentary character of common law unfair competition as compared to the
ramifications of modern competitive methods and does not rest upon
any examination into the actual operations of the ordinary courts in anti-
trust matters. There are problems aplenty in the antitrust field, including
problems as to the suitability of alternative enforcement tribunals; but
perplexity as to the best means of enforcement will scarely be resolved
by the sketchy type of consideration given by the Task Force to the
choice of a tribunal.
The Administrative Court, then, will be a sound development if
such a tribunal can be established with non-regulatory jurisdiction suf-
ficient in volume and diversity to justify the existence of the court in
preference to a small number of separate legislative courts; but regulatory
adjudication should not be entrusted to it unless the Task Force's basic
111. 52 STAT. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
112. T.F. Rept., pp. 250-53.
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belief, that all such adjudication belongs potentially to the courts, is to be
accepted. The validity of that belief will be examined in the final section
of this article.
E. The Hearing Commissioners
With respect to the administrative processes of government agen-
cies, the crux of the reports, particularly the report of the Task Force,
is reached in the recommendations as to hearing commissioners and
the relative roles of these commissioners and agency heads in formu-
lating decisions. These recommendations would substitute hearing
commissioners for the hearing examiners now employed under Sec-
tion 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act.'13 The recommendations
can be classified into two categories: (1) employment, tenure, status, com-
pensation, and removal of hearing commissioners; and (2) the extent of
the authority of these officers."'
The Commission and the Task Force both recommend that a separate
corps of hearing commissioners, outside of the various agencies, be
established and be attached to the Administrative Court. 5 The under-
lying thought is that the hearing commissioners should be appointed by
an authority other than the agencies whose proceedings they will hear
and that their tenure, status, compensation, and removal also be deter-
mined independently of the latter agencies. All personnel matters relat-
ing to the hearing commissioners would be in charge of a Chief Hearing
Commissioner appointed by the President with the advice and consent
of the Senate," 6 who would hold office for twelve years and who would
be removable only by the Council of the Administrative Court for cause,
after opportunity for hearing." 7  The Chief Hearing Commissioner
would be aided by a so-called Advisory Committee which would have
the more-than-advisory functions of promulgating rules to prescribe the
qualifications of hearing commissioners and passing on the appointment
of commissioners proposed by the Chief Hearing Commissioner."' Con-
trary to the presidential appointment recommended in both reports, the
proposed Code would have the Advisory Committee named by the Council
of the Administrative Court. The Committee would have five members
113. 60 STAT. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1952).
114. For a more detailed discussion of these recommendations see Fuchs, The
Recommendations as to Hearing Commissioners, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1342 (1955).
115. H.C. Rept. No. 52; T.F. Rept. No. 66. The Task Force's black-letter recom-
mendation does not include attachment of the hearing commissioners to the Court; but
the text of its report (T.F. Rept., p. 264) and the proposed Administrative Code (Code
§ 500) both provide for such an attachment.
116. H.C. Rept., p. 89; T.F. Rept., p. 264; Code § 500.
117. Code § 500.
118. H.C. Rept., p. 90; T.F. Rept., pp. 264-65; Code § 501.
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representing the judiciary, the agencies, and the bar, with a judge of the
Administrative Court as chairman.
Both reports state that "it should be the primary responsibility of
the Chief Hearing Commissioner to recruit and to nominate outstanding
men for hearing commissioner positions."'19 Neither in the reports nor in
the applicable Code provisions is any requirement stated that merit-
system methods must be followed in the selection of hearing commission-
ers. Both reports provide for two grades of positions, 2 ' which the Task
Force and the proposed Code1 21 would make, respectively, those of hearing
commissioners paid $12,000 a year for eight-year terms and senior hear-
ing commissioners paid $14,000 a year and enjoying tenure during good
behavior. Commissioners would be assigned to the several agencies by
the Chief Hearing Commissioner. No specific provision is made for the
manner in which these assignments would be made, but the Commission
report states that "hearing commissioners should be allowed to develop
continuity of service in one agency with the resulting familiarity and
competence that the special experience should create," and the Task Force
states that "it is anticipated that hearing commissioners will be assigned
to agencies on a semipermanent basis, and that they will not be reassigned
except for unusual circumstances.",'22 The applicable Code provision reads
that "the Chief Hearing Commissioner shall assign and transfer hearing
commissioners to and from agencies as he may determine to be necessary
for the most efficient conduct of the hearings required to be held by such
agencies. 1 23 Hearing commissioners would be removable during their
terms only for cause, after opportunity for hearing before a committee
of judges of the Administrative Court upon charges filed by the Chief
Hearing Commissioner.
12 4
The reports and the proposed Code, taken together, make some-
what ambiguous provision for "grandfather rights" in the present hearing
examiners with relation to appointment to hearing commissionerships.
This problem because of its temporary nature, will not be considered
here, although it is highly important to a successful launching of the
hearing-commissioner scheme. 23
The foregoing provisions for hearing-commissioner personnel ad-
ministration have a number of good features. A personnel system out-
119. H.C. Rept., p. 90; T.F. Rept., p. 264.
120. H.C. Rept., p. 91; T.F. Rept., p. 265.
121. Code §§ 501, 505, 506.
122. H.C. Rept., p. 92; T.F. Rept., p. 423.
123. Code § 504.
124. Code § 507.
125. See Fuchs, The Recommendations as to Hearing Commissioners, 30 N.Y.U.L
REv. 1342, 1343, 1353-54 (1955).
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side of the Civil Service Commission would be justified if it could be
surrounded with adequate assurance that merit-system principles would
be observed." 6 The device of a Chief Hearing Commissioner, assisted by
a professional committee with policy-making powers, is a good one. The
terms of appointment and compensation of the hearing commissioners,
specified in the reports, also seem appropriate. Two weaknesses appear in
the proposed scheme. One is that no statutory assurance is given that
merit-system principles will be followed; the other is that, unless federal
administrative agencies are to be deprived of authority over the process
of decision to a greater extent than this writer believes to be justified,
the authority to select hearing commissioners should not be removed from
the agencies as completely as the recommendations provide.
As to the first weakness, it seems evident that hearing-commissioner
positions would become desirable political plums that would be plucked
unless barriers to the intrusion of politics in the filling of these posts
were set up. What may be called ideological politics would present an
equally grave threat, as interests favoring and opposing regulation
struggled to gain control of the processes of hearing and decision.'27
Inexperience of the Chief Hearing Commissioner and the Advisory Com-
mittee in personnel administration might, moreover, be a handicap in
devising effective methods of selecting hearing commissioners unless
suitable guidance were available to them. The proposed Code 2 would
provide that not more than three members of the Advisory Committee
could be members of the same political party; but the real safeguard
against abuse and assurance of sound methods would lie in the professional
skill and sense of responsibility of the Committee and the Chief Hearing
Commissioner. These should be a main reliance, but the pressures would
be great, and, if resistance were not strong, the scheme could easily be
perverted. Minimum safeguards should be the inclusion of provisions in
the Code for suitable merit-system methods to be followed, and for a
member of the Advisory Committee to be appointed by the Civil Service
Commission. Without these safeguards more might be lost than gained
by the adoption of the proposals now made, and it would be preferable to
follow the recommendation of the President's Conference on Administra-
126. See Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 CORN.
L.Q. 281 (1955).
127. See Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 63 HARv. L. REv. 737 (1950) ; Thomas, The Selectiot of Federal Hearing
Examiners: Pressure Groups and the Administrative Process, 59 YALE L.J. 431 (1950).
128. Code § 501.
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tive Procedure that administration by the Civil Service Commission be
retained and strengthened.' 9
As to the second weakness, the writer believes, as will presently
appear, that the agencies should retain more complete authority over their
decisions than the Task Force, in particular, proposes; and it seems fair
to conclude that, if so, a safeguarded scheme of agency selection from
limited registers of eligibles maintained by a merit-system type of
personnel administration, preferably outside of the Civil Service Com-
mission, would on the whole be preferable to the present proposals. The
hearing commissioners would then remain officers of the several agencies,
subject to a method of selection, protection from possible agency pres-
sures, and promotion of esprit de corps among them that might contribute
much to improving the quality of agency proceedings.'
In addition to recommending a new type of personnel administration
for hearing commissioners, the Commission and Task Force reports
propose to increase the status and independence of these officials in the
conduct and decision of proceedings, as compared to the authority of
examiners under the Administrative Procedure Act.' The recommenda-
tions to this effect in the Commission's report are among those which
have the actual sponsorship of only three Commissioners. The correspond-
ing recommendations of the Task Force are of central importance in the
attainment of that group's objectives. The function of the hearing
commissioners would be to conduct all statutory agency hearings except
those in which the agency itself or a member of an agency or statutory
board presided 32 and to render initial decisions in such proceedings.
Both the Task Force and the Commission recommend enlarging
the powers of hearing commissioners during hearings. The proposed
extensions of authority confer (1) the power to issue subpoenas in all
cases; (2) discovery powers; (3) power to require conferences of
parties; (4) power to rule on all motions, including motions to dis-
miss; (5) disciplinary powers in hearings; and (6) authority to take
other actions in accord, to the extent practicable, with trial procedure in
the United States district courts.' Interlocutory appeals from hearing-
129. President's Conference on Administrative Procedure, Report 9-10, 57-63
(1955).
130. Fuchs, The Hearing Officer Problem-Symptom and Symbol, 40 CORN. L.Q.
281, 312-20 (1955).
131. A.P.A. § 7(b), 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(b) (1952).
132. H.C. Rept. No. 41; T.F. Rept. No. 45; Code § 205(a). The authority to
employ hearing officers other than hearing examiners under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, presently existing under the Immigration and Nationality Act [66 Stat.
166, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (4) (1952)], would be revoked. One other instance of similar
authority is reported by the Task Force report. (T.F. Rept., p. 193, see also p. 411).
133. H.C. Rept. No. 41(b); T.F. Rept. No. 46; Code § 205(b).
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commissioner actions and rulings would be restricted by the Task Force
to such as the presiding officer might find "necessary . . . to prevent
substantial prejudice to any party or to expedite the conduct of the
proceeding." '134 To such possible appeals the recommendation in the Com-
mission's report would add appeals that might result from a showing to
the agency that substantial prejudice would otherwise result.""
The Task Force and Commission-transmitted recommendations
would render the Administrative Procedure Act's provision for "separa-
tion of functions" '36 more rigorous and extend it to all instances of rule-
making and adjudication in which agency action is based on the record
of the hearing." 7 The requirement that proceedings be of the record
type would be applied to all proceedings in which a hearing, whether other-
wise required to be of record type or not, is mandatory under a constitu-
tional or statutory provision."'3 In addition the Task Force, but not the
recommendations in the Commission's report, would require that in all
record-type proceedings the presiding officer, who almost always would
be a hearing commissioner," 9 must render an "initial decision," unless
such a decision was waived by the parties. That decision would become
the agency's decision if not set aside upon agency review ;1o the agency's
power in reviewing such a decision would be the same as that of a court
in reviewing an agency decision, "except for questions of policy com-
mitted to the determination of the agency by the Congress."' 4' Pursuant
to a proposal for expanded scope of judicial review, made by the Task
Force and transmitted by the Commission, 43 this would mean that hear-
ing-commissioner determinations of fact would become final unless "clear-
ly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record."
The enlarged authority of hearing commissioners in the hearings
themselves seems desirable. The powers to be conferred should promote
the dignity and efficiency of hearings, and it is difficult to see why any of
them should prove objectionable. The proposal in the Commission's
report with respect to interlocutory appeals seems preferable to that of the
Task Force; for although such appeals should be restricted so far as
134. Code § 205(c). Cf. T.F. Rept., p. 199.
135. H.C. Rept. No. 41(c).
136. A.P.A. § 5(c), 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1952).
137. H.C. Rept. Nos. 33(c), 37; T.F. Rept. Nos. 35, 41; Code § 204(c).
138. Code §§ 205, 206.
139. See note 132 suqpra.
140. Code § 206(b).
141. Code § 206(c).
142. H.C. Rept. No. 44; T.F. Rept. No. 52; Code § 207(f).
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feasible,'43 it would surely serve the interests of all parties to permit
an agency to determine immediately some questions, vitally affecting
a proceeding, which would be subject to its determination in the end, even
though the hearing commissioner might be unwilling to allow an inter-
mediate appeal.
The Task Force's proposal for initial decisions by hearing com-
missioners, subject to limited agency review, would place the power to
find facts largely in the hearing commissioners' hands. Upon judicial
review, a dissatisfied party might not only contest the merits, but claim
that the agency had exercised more than the limited check permitted to it.
The agencies would be confronted in every instance of rule-making or
adjudication based on a hearing with the question of what the scope of
that check was. The check would embrace questions of law and policy
entrusted by the statute to the agency, but not questions of fact.
In relation to an analogous problem, the Task Force complains of
the doubt that continues to surround the distinction between questions
of law which, when determined by an agency, remain subject to judicial
redetermination, and questions of fact which, under existing law, an
agency may determine with finality so long as there is substantial evidence
in support."' The effects of this troublesome problem are confined to the
relatively small number of cases in which judicial review of agency deter-
minations is sought. The Task Force's proposed limitation of agency
review of hearing-commissioner determinations, by contrast, would affect
every hearirig proceeding in which a fact-policy question was involved and
would plague the agencies each time they were required to review hearing-
commissioner determinations in such cases. No one would know whether
the hearing commissioner or the agency should have the last word as to,
for example, the safety of transportation equipment, the deceptiveness
of competitive practices, the relative need of communities for broadcast
services, and a host of other questions which heretofore have lain at the
core of agency responsibility. Agency decisions would be handicapped
by inescapable doubts, and litigation to resolve those doubts favorably
to losing parties would be vastly encouraged. For this reason alone the
recommendations should be rejected.
A still more fundamental objection to the Task Force's proposal
rests upon the importance of fact determination in relation to the dis-
charge of agency responsibility. That responsibility would continue to
include the duty to effectuate the legislation the agencies are established
143. The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure has taken the same
view. Report 41, 81-82 (1955).
144. T.F. Rept., pp. 216-17.
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to administer. The compulsion to proceed under the handicap of fact
determination by hearing commissioners who were removed from agency
control and whose conclusions of fact were to a considerable extent be-
yond revision, would render agency membership and other positions of
top responsibility for rule-making and adjudication stultifying and un-
attractive. It is a mistake to suppose that fact determination is a mechani-
cal process which, if correctly employed by a neutral authority, leads
always to a "right" answer as distinguished from a "wrong" one.
Facts, even simple facts, established by means of a hearing, must be infer-
ences drawn from the evidence; conflicting inferences will be possible to
the extent that each is rationally supportable on the basis of evidence
favorable to it when cast against the opposing evidence. 45 After the trier
of fact has mustered all the objectivity and conscientiousness of which
he is capable, his inferences are still likely to be the product of conscious
or unconscious choice within rational limits. In the absence of some
countervailing reason for attempting strict neutrality, such as applies in
criminal cases or in civil litigation where public policy favors neither
side, the trier of fact should be charged with responsibility for the public
purpose of the proceeding in which he is a participant; yet the Task
Force's proposal, by attempting to introduce a supposedly neutral officer
as the fact-determiner in an agency proceeding, would substitute other,
more fortuitous and variant predilections for the agency's. Such a
change-except in proceedings such as deportation, where no -discretion-
ary determinations vitally affect personal freedom-would benefit no
one except, from time to time, a party whose interest happened to coincide
with a particular hearing commissioner's predilections. The change would
be especially harmful in rule-making 46 and in relation to facts of a so-
called "forward-looking" nature," such as the future requirements of
public convenience and necessity, the degree of control one corporation
may be able to exercise over another by reason of a minority stock inter-
145. See DICKINSoN, ADmINISTRATIvE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW 318-
19 (1927); BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK
329, 336-38 (1942).
146. The Task Force report states at one point that in agency review of initial
decisions in rule-making "agencies should . . . have all the powers which they would
have in making the initial decision themselves," "because the making of the [rules] in-
volves policy considerations which justify independent appraisal of pertinent facts and
circumstances by the agency." T.F. Rept., p. 204. The contrary recommendations pre-
viously cited are explicit, however, and it is believed the Task Force intended its general
preservation of agency review of questions of policy to take care of the point which is
made in the passage just quoted.
147. American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 192 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
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est,1 ' and the "reasonableness" of a public utility rate in terms of the
financial results it may be expected to produce.
The proposed intensification and extension of the "separation of
functions," which both the Task Force and the Commission-transmitted
recommendations propose, would provide that hearing commissioners
shall not "be advised by any other agency or employee except as a witness
or counsel in public proceedings of which all parties have notice and in
which they have full opportunity to participate, or - . . permit any other
agency officer or employee to participate in any way in the formulation of
findings or decisions"' 9 and hence would render absolute in all cases of
formal rule-making and adjudication the limited separation of functions
which the Administrative Procedure Act at present imposes only in
certain instances of adjudication.' As respects agency personnel, hearing
commissioners would be more completely insulated from resorting to
available sources of information than are the judges of trial courts. In
respect to facts of which judicial notice may be taken and in questions of
law, trial judges may freely consult sources of information available to
them, including persons, other than parties, who may possess the desired
information. The theory of the proposed absolute separation of functions
is that the entire agency is a party which, accordingly, should be consulted
by the hearing commissioner only in open proceedings. This theory
ignores, however, the historical and practical fact that administrative
agencies were established for the very purpose of making the knowledge
and experience of their staffs available in deciding matters before them
and that the process of consultation is the natural method by which
this may be done.
The Administrative Procedure Act wisely restricts its prohibition
of hearing-officer consultation to consultation with agency personnel
who have engaged in investigating or prosecuting in the same or a
related proceeding and to consultation with any person or party, including
agency personnel, regarding "any fact in issue;" '151 and even this pro-
hibition applies only to adjudication other than initial licensing and
certain proceedings in the regulation of utilities. The Task Force, by con-
trast, acts in the belief that "to assert that formal rule making is, unlike
148. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n., 127 F.2d 378
(9th Cir. 1952).
149. Code § 204(c).
150. A.P.A. § 5(c), 60 STAT. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004(c) (1952).
151. It can be argued tenably that the act does not prohibit consultation with
agency personnel, other than investigating and prosecuting officers. See DAVIs, AD-
mlNISATIVE LAW 415-16 (1951). This view, however, is believed to be less tenable
than a more literal interpretation which conforms to the words used and provides a
safeguard against off-the-record consultation with anyone as to litigated facts.
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adjudication, not an adversary proceeding is to have regard only to the
form of the proceeding and to ignore realities. 15 2 Many administrative
proceedings, especially of a rule-making nature, however, are likely to be
proceedings in which a wide range of facts and broad issues of policy are
to be determined. To deny the hearing commissioner authority to use
agency channels to ascertain facts which are susceptible to official notice,
and to require him to determine questions of law and policy in isolation
from the normal sources of aid which an agency can provide, is to cut
the heart out of administrative processes.
The recommendation of the Task Force that the presiding officers
prepare initial decisions in all proceedings unless such decisions are
waived is, on the other hand, supported by strong considerations. When
such a practice is followed, the presiding officer's familiarity with the
case, through having presided at the oral hearing, is brought into play,
and the hearing itself is given added dignity and efficiency by the knowl-
edge that the presiding officer will be in command of the case until an
initial decision has been rendered. Nevertheless, where the evidence
submitted at the hearing is largely in writing and of a technical character,
it may well be, as some agencies have long maintained, that other staff
members may be in a better position than the presiding officer to
formulate a proposed decision that will be useful to the agency and
afford the parties an adequate forecast of what the agency may decide.
If so, an initial decision prepared by the presiding officer will not make
the maximum contribution to the decisional process at this stage. The
Task Force does not adduce sufficient data in support of its conclusion
to warrant incorporating its recommendation into legislation now. The
report does disclose that the "initial decision is presently used in 11
statutory proceedings" and that "in nine others, the hearing examiner
may prepare a recommended decision.""'15 There is, however, no informa-
tion as to whether these proceedings are, on the whole, better conducted
than others. It would be desirable to allow this matter to rest pending
further study.
F. Administrative Procedure and Judicial Review
Within the area commonly embraced by lawyers' administrative law
the Task Force recommendations and those transmitted by the Com-
mission deal with a wide range of matters in addition to the points affect-
ing hearing commissioners which have just been discussed. These include:
(1) information as to agency operations and action; (2) procedure in
152. T.F. Rept., p. 164.
153. T.F. Rept., p. 202.
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rule-making; (3) procedure in informal adjudication; (4) formal adjudi-
cative procedure; and (5) judicial review of agency action. In addi-
tion, the proposed Office of Legal Service and Procedure Would be given
important functions in relation to agency procedures.
1. Information as to Agency Operations and Action
The Task Force recommendations and those in the Commission's
report (endorsed by three Commissioners) advocate more complete publi-
cation in the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations of de-
scriptions of agency organization, procedures, and policies than now
obtains, and fuller availability of unpublished documents than presently
prevails." 4 No agency rule, order, or opinion would be effective unless
published or, in the case of orders or opinions, made available to public
inspection as, provided by law, except where a person has actual knowl-
edge pursuant to statute. " Although the Task Force's discussion is
extremely informative and helpful, "6 it is not possible in this review to
discuss the details of the situation disclosed in the report with respect
to present practice.57
The principal question that arises concerning the proposed require-
ments for publication is whether the Federal Register and Code of Federal
Regulations would become unmanageably bulky if. the recommendations
were carried out; but probably the .requirements of big government in a
complex world should be faced and means be devised to keep the con-
sequences within the capacity of ordinary human beings, as the physical
aspects of mechanization have been. The recommendations, however, con-
tain no provision dispensing with the publication requirement for possi-
ble emergency regulations which may need dissemination by radio or
other means of rapid comunication, although the possibility that other
statutes may make such provision is recognized. It would seem that such
provision should be made.'
A related recommendation transmitted by the Commission is to the
effect that "no sanction should be imposed for any act done or omitted
154. H.C. Rept. No. 32; T.F. Rept. Nos. 27-30.
155. H.C. Rept. No. 32(e); T.F. Rept. No. 31.
156. See also Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publi-
cation of Federal Regulations, 63 HAv. L. REV. 929 (1950).
157. T.F. Rept., pp. 144-56.
158. The recommendations and proposed Code make provision for dispensing with
procedures anterior to the issuance of emergency regulations and for short form methods
of publication. H.C. Rept. No. 33(b); T.F. Rept. No. 34; Code §§ 200(a), 202(d).
The former, however, are dependent upon publication of notice in the Federal Regis-
ter. Hotch v. United States, 208 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1953), which the Task Force cites
in its discussion (T.F. Rept., pp. 162-63), involved fishing regulations for Alaskan
waters which should be subject to, amendment to meet day-to-day conditions and be
made effective upon radio transmission.
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in good faith reliance upon an advisory written statement issued to any
person by an officer of the agency specially authorized to do so.""' The
Task Force's corresponding recomhmendation covers also good-faith
reliance upon a duly published rule. 6 ' These recommendations involve
a genuine problem that has been dealt with in previous specific legis-
lation.6 ' and has called forth other proposals for a general statutory pro-
vision.'62 Whatever precise solution may be arrived at, the reports do
well to call attention to the need for over-all legislative treatment.
2. Procedure in Rule-Making
The recommendations in the reports with respect to rule-making
would (a) extend and add to the requirements which section 4 of the
Administrative Procedure Act now imposes with respect to informal rule-
making procedures and (b) greatly extend present requirements that
rule-making be based on the record of a hearing, as well as attach the
mandatory sepration of functions to such proceedings.'
Military and foreign affairs functions, matters relating to agency
management or public property, functions involving loans, benefits,
grants, or contracts, interpretative rules, rules of practice, and mere
statements of policy are exempted from procedural requirements of the
present act.'64 All of these exemptions would be withdrawn under the
recommendations. Thirty days' notice of opportunity to submit data,
views, or arguments would be given; the agency would be required to
accompany the resulting regulations with a statement of the considerations
for and against; and reasons would have to be given for an agency's
failure to initiate rule-making proceedings upon petition to it to do so.'6"
Emergency regulations, effective for not more than 120 days, would be
permitted where necessary, without observance of the otherwise requisite
procedures. 6
The removal of the military and foreign-affairs, public-property,
and loans-benefits-contract exemptions from the rule-making procedural
requirements seems sound. As the Task Force points out,'67 the distinc-
159. H.C. Rept. No. 46.
160. T.F. Rept. No. 56; Code § 208(c).
161. See T.F. Rept., p. 225.
162. Cf. 7 AD. LAW BULL. 224-25 (1955).
163. See note 137 supra.
164. A.P.A. § 4, 60 STAT. 338 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1952).
165. H.C. Rept. No. 33; T.F. Rept. Nos. 32, 33; Code § 201.
166. H.C. Rept. No. 33(b); T.F. Rept. No. 34; Code § 201(d). The Commis-
sioners' recommendation would have the emergency provision apply "when necessary for
the protection of public health, safety, or welfare," whereas the Task Force would sub-
stitute "morals" for "welfare." The term "morals" seems unduly restrictive.
167. T.F. Rept., pp. 158-59.
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tions they establish are artificial and to a large extent lacking in practical
justification. To require all agencies, including the armed forces, to, go
through substantial procedures in order to make regulations to govern
their own affairs seems excessive however, and a way should be found to
maintain an exemption for such regulations without creating an escape
for some regulations, such as postal regulations, that affect the public.
Interpretative regulations affect the public and are given weight by the
courts; but their merits are fully litigable, and it seems undesirable to
impose procedural requirements upon a rule-making function, such as
that of the Treasury in expounding its view of a new tax statute, which is
of particular benefit when fully and expeditiously performed. Even the
escape of emergency regulations seems inadequate as to such matters
when elaborate procedures would have to follow. The requirements of
added agency explanations to those whose petitions or contentions were
not accepted also seem excessive. There is, after all, a limit to the pro-
cedures that should be demandable as of right when limited agency re-
sources are to be apportioned in serving the public good.
Drastic extension of the requirement that regulations be based on the
record of a hearing would be accomplished by provisions in the proposed
Code that formal hearing requirements shall apply "in every case of . . .
rule making required under the Constitution or by statute to be determined
after opportunity for an agency hearing."'68 The proposal for extension
seems almost to be an inadvertence, since the Task Force report states
erroneously in two places that the Administrative Procedure Act already
requires a record-type hearing wherever the Constitution or other legisla-
tion imposes a hearing requirement;169 yet it is difficult to believe that
the changed wording of the proposed Code provisions is actually unin-
tentional.' These provisions, in any event, would at one stroke impose
the full panoply of formal hearing requirements upon multi-party pro-
ceedings, oft-times involving complicated regulations based on a variety
of technological and policy factors.' In attempted justification of the
extension of separation of functions to formal rule making, the Task
Force states that to assert that formal rule-making, in comparison to
adjudication, is not an adversary proceeding, is to ignore realities.7 2
168. Code § 206. See also § 205.
169. T.F. Rept., pp. 164( 410. Actually § 4(b) of the act, note 164 supra, provides
that the formal requirements of §§ 7 and 8 shall apply "where rides are required by
statute to be made on the record after an opportunity for agency hearing." (Italics
supplied.)
170. A similar change as to adjudication is deliberately proposed. T.F. Rept., p. 169.
171. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report
109-11 (1941).
172. T.F. Rept., p. 164.
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Granted that this may be so,173 the question of what proceedings are subject
to this reasoning still remains; the Task Force advances no justification
for bringing in the whole range of rule-making which has been subject
to statutory hearing procedures but not to the record requirement. The
attempt to bring about so sweeping a formalization of rule-making pro-
cesses should be rejected out of hand.
3. Procedure in Informal Adjudication
One of the most drastic proposals in the report of the Task Force,
which finds only a weak counterpart in the Commission's report, is the
recommendation that in adjudications not required to be accompanied
by opportunity for agency hearing, including "the performance of all
proprietary functions such as the use or disposition of public property
or the execution of public contracts in which private rights, claims, or
privileges are asserted or affected, a decision shall be proposed by a
duly designated and responsible officer of the agency and served upon
the parties by mail or delivered in person" and shall be reviewable "within
the agency by a board or superior officer designated by the agency ....
after the receipt and full consideration of the evidence and the views and
arguments of all interested parties."' 4 Temporary adjudication in
emergencies could be rendered in advance of the proposed procedures.
The separation of functions would apply to intra-agency reviewing
authorities."'
One may assume that, contrary to the literal wording of the proposed
Code provision, an initial rejection of a private claim might take place
without the submission of a "proposed decision," e.g., by the gatekeeper
of a national park or a contracting officer in relation to bidders. Despite
this assumption, the suggestion that all of the Federal Government's vast
operations in relation to persons outside of the Government should be
carried on subject to such an array of procedural rights seems completely
fantastic. The Task Force rightly points to numerous instances in which
intra-agency review procedures are voluntarily accorded at the present
time, and it suggests validly that such procedures may usefully be
extended,'76 but it is a far cry from this observation to the sweeping
provision actually proposed. If extensions are to be made, the areas in
which they are to be applied must be specified. There seems, moreover,
173. Id. at pp. 108-09; Fuchs, Contstitutional Implications of the Opp Cotton Mills
Case with Respect to Procedure and Judicial Review in Administrative Rule-Making, 27
WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (1941).
174. Code, § 202(b). See also H.C. Rept. No. 34; T.F. Rept. No. 38.
175. Code § 204(c) ; T.F. Rept., p. 409.
176. T.F. Rept., p. 171.
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to be no good reason for applying the separation of functions to agency
determinations in which the element of private right is secondary.
4. Formal Adjudicative Procedure
In respect to formal agency adjudication the recommendations of
the Task Force and those transmitted by the Commission propose an
extension of the record requirement to all instances in which a hearing of
any kind is required under the Constitution or by statute, similar to that
proposed for rule-making.'77 Since the courts have displayed a tendency
to find that the record requirement as to adjudications exists by implica-
tion, ' the effect of such an extension by a general statute might not be
as great as in relation to rule-making. The Task Force report, moreover,
enumerates the instances to which the extension might be expected to ap-
ply.170 It does not, however, demonstrate that considerations relating to
procedural efficiency or the public interest do not require an informal,
expeditious type of hearing in some situations. The specific instances
should be examined before a blanket provision is made applicable to them.
Aside from matters relating to the authority of hearing officers,
which have already been noticed, the principal added procedural require-
ment which the recommendations would attach to formal adjudication
is that the rules of evidence and requirements of proof in civil nonjury
cases in the United States district courts should apply "so far as prac-
ticable."'8 0 Since court practice and the practice of agencies in this
regard are drawing closer together,' 8 ' and since this provision is flexible,
its effects would probably be less far-reaching than appears at first glance.
An accompanying provision with respect to official notice'8 2 would also
work relatively slight change. Both provisions might improve agency
practice by directing attention to the desirability of screening evidence
reasonably and of affording opportunity for rebuttal with respect to
noticed facts; but these provisions might also breed litigation over
whether they had been properly applied. The need for them seems
doubtful.
The reports also make the salutary recommendation that settlements
and shortened procedures be employed to the maximum extent feasible.' 8 '
When coupled with adequate authority in the presiding officer to require
177. H.C. Rept. No. 34(b); T.F. Rept. No. 37; Code § 202(b).
178. The Task Force report cites the decisions at p. 168.
179. Id. at p. 169-70.
180. H.C. Rept. No. 42. See also T.F. Rept. No. 47; Code § 205(d).
181. DAvis, ADMINISTRATW LAW 447-57.
182. Code § 205 (e).
183. H.C. Rept., p. 57, No. 40(b); T.F. Rept. Nos. 36, 44.
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conferences of the parties, to simplify the issues, and to limit proof,'
these measures can do much to improve the efficiency of formal admin-
istrative processes. It is significant that the President's Conference on
Administrative Procedure concentrated its attention to a considerable
extent upon these matters.'
5. Judicial Review of Agency Action
Much might be written about the report of the Task Force with
regard to judicial review of agency action, for the report contains many
statements about present practice and desirable alterations in it that seem
to call for comment. Space does not permit discussion of details, however,
and this review will be confined to the principal recommendations of the
Task Force and those contained in the Commission's report.
The Task Force proposes that judicial review of agency action giving
rise to "legal wrong" be available,'86 and this recommendation is trans-
lated in the proposed Code into a right of review in "any person adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action."' 87 The recommendation trans-
mitted by the Commission and concurred in by three members, provides
that "legal wrong" should be redressable unless Congress expressly pro-
vides otherwise ;... but the Commission's report remarks, somewhat un-
certainly, that, while Congress should want even persons to whom it
accords bounties to have a day in court to vindicate their claims, "there
undoubtedly are areas of administrative action which are not subject to
judicial review, such as matters of internal administration."' The Task
Force's intention seems to be more in accord with the broad language
of the proposed Code provision than with limiting judicial review to
redressing "legal wrong" in a traditional sense, for its report stresses
claims for pensions and other benefits as among those which should not
be subject to denial without possibility of judicial review.'
The Task Force's logic is good. Capricious administrative action
denying claims to bounty is as harmful in a practical sense as actions
adversely affecting rights of a more traditional sort; judicial review is a
useful check upon possible administrative arbitrariness, as reported cases
occasionally attest. It does not follow, however, that the increased litiga-
tion that would result from, for example, opening denial of veterans'
184. Code § 205(b).
185. President's Conference on Adminsitrative Procedure, Report 13, 33-34, 36-41,
66, 70-81 (1955).
186. T.F. Rept. No. 50.
187. Code § 207(a).
188. H.C. Rept. No. 43.
189. H.C. Rept., p. 74.
190. T.F. Rept., p. 208.
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claims to judicial review, can wisely be imposed on the courts or that,
taken as a whole, veterans would be treated more justly by an administra-
tive process combined with a judicial check than they are now by an
agency which accords generous procedures and is in a politically sensitive
position. One would feel more confident in applying the Task Force's
recommendation if agency-by-agency studies accompanied it. In their
absence, one can at most recognize a presumption in favor of applying
the recommendation in various situations. Non-reviewability is a fiction
to some extent (since courts find ways to check administrative action
when they are moved to do so) and gives rise to numerous unsatisfactory
distinctions which it would be desirable to abolish so far as feasible.' 9'
The Task Force.also proposes to substitute simple statutory review
procedures for the multiplicity of non-statutory remedies now prevail-
ing.912 The question of the proper remedy gives trouble only occasion-
ally;193 but frustrations sometimes arise and no good reason exists for
not affording easy access to hte courts in all cases that may properly go
there. '9 In providing that the court shall proceed on the basis of the
administrative record when the administrative action is based on such a
record and shall conduct a trial when it is not, 9 ' the Task Force conforms
to a dichotomy of remedies that is fundamental but sometimes fails of
recognition. 99
The Task Force would broaden the scope of judicial review in sev-
eral important respects. Agency action would be subject to reversal in case
of "clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion"'9 7 as well as for "abuse
of discretion" as at present.9 8 Conflict of agency action with statutory
"purposes," as well as with statutory "jurisdiction, authority, or limita-
tions," would also result in reversal. Findings, in case of administrative
action based upon a record, would be set aside if they were "clearly erron-
eous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record," rather than "unsupported by substantial evidence" on the
191. Davis, Unreviewable Administrative Action, 15 F.R.D. 411 (1954).
192. Code § 207(b).
193. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report c.
VI (1941).
194. The Task Force (T.F. Rept., p. 211) makes a salutary recommendation that
proceedings for review should be maintainable against either an agency, the officials
who compose it, or any person representing it. Inability of a plaintiff to sue outside of
the District of Columbia, where the doctrine that agency heads are indispensable parties
applies, would thus be eliminated.
195. Code § 207(e).
196. See Fuchs, Judicial Control of Admdnistrative Action in Indiana, 28 IND. L.J.
1, 8-11 (1952).
197. T.F. Rept., p. 217.
198. A.P.A. § 10(e), 60 STAT. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1952).
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basis of the whole record, as at present. 9 The recommendation in the
Commission's report concurs as to substitution of the "clearly erroneous"
rule for the "substantial evidence" rule.2"' In addition, in cases where
the agency has not decided on the basis of the record of a hearing, the
Task Force would have the court proceed on the basis of "the facts as
established in and by the reviewing court," without giving prima facie
weight to agency determinations.20' Judicial deference to agency deter-
mination of "mixed questions of law and fact" involved in the interpreta-
tion of statutes would end.20 2
It is not made clear that actual evils lie back of these recommenda-
tions as to scope of review, except in relation to judicial deference re-
garding "mixed questions of law and fact"; and even here the Task
Force seems impelled by objections to existing curtailment of "the pro-
tection which judicial review should" for some abstract reason provide,0 '
rather than by the impossibility which exists at present of forecasting
the extent of judicial deference from case to case. 2 4 An analogy is drawn
between judicial review of agency action and appellate-court review of
non-jury trial-court decisions which is deemed to establish a desirable
norm; but the analogy ignores the special competence of administrative
agencies acting within their province, a factor not present in the reviewing
courts. This competence is the principal reason for limiting judicial
review of agency fact determinations by the substantial evidence rule.202
The Task Force's contention that the rule was developed to economize
judicial time and effort in going over voluminous administrative records,
caused by loose agency practice in admitting evidence, 00 seems manu-
factured out of whole cloth; and it overlooks the fact that courts have
sometimes applied the substantial evidence rule even where their review
of agency action has been based on records compiled in court by trial de
novo.2 °7
199. T.F. Rept., pp. 215-18; Code § 207(f).
200. H.C. Rept. No. 44.
201. Code § 207(f). See T.F. Rept. Nos. 51, 53.
202. T.F. Rept., p. 216. See Code § 207(g). The Task Force cites the most cele-
brated case involving this type of question, National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst
Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944), where the question was whether certain vendors of
newspapers were, under certain facts, independent contractors or "employees" within
the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act.
203. T.F. Rept., p. 216.
204. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 887-910; Benjamin, Judicial Review of Admin-
istrative Adjudication: Some Recent Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals, 48
CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 12-19 (1948).
205. Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report 91
(1941); WARREN (ed.), THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 546, 592-96 (1947) ; DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 877-80.
206. T.F. Rept., p. 215.
207. Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Co., 249 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1919).
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How much change would actually be wrought by the proposed enact-
ment of statutory provisions designed to broaden judicial review cannot be
determined. The factors which have led courts to limit their review when
no statutory provisions compelled them to do so would still be operative.
Yet the legislative intention, if the recommendations were enacted, would
be clear, and the courts might feel compelled to respond to it with result-
ing damage to the effectuation of the purposes the agencies were estab-
lished to serve. At the very least, years of litigation would be required
to determine what the new formulas really did mean. The reports do not
set forth any convincing reason why the existing formulas, which by now
have become reasonably clear in most respects, should be changed.
One additional provision recommended in the reports has extremely
harmful potentialities and should be rejected decisively. The Task Force
would have it that "courts of competent jurisdiction should- be empowered
to enjoin, at any stage of an agency proceeding, agency action in excess
of constitutional or statutory authority. '202 To this the Commission-
transmitted recommendation would add the safeguard that a "frivolous
or delaying action contesting the agency's authority" should cast "costs
and attorneys' fees or an equivalent sum in lieu thereof ' 20 upon the
plaintiff. The proposal seems to constitute a wide-open invitation to
harassment of the agencies at every turn, which the requirement of a
"showing of irreparable damage" would do little to check. Even suits that
proved to be without merit would have their value as delaying actions.
The doctrine that administrative remedies must be exhausted before resort
may be had to a court, which the proposal would profoundly modify, has
at times imposed inconvenience and even serious loss; but on the whole
its operation has been salutary. It has, moreover, not prevented injunctive
relief from being accorded where administrative usurpation or serious
abuse could be shown.210 The reports set forth little justification for weak-
ening it drastically now.
6. Office of Legal Services and Procedure
From the standpoint of long-run improvement of federal administra-
tive procedures, the most important recommendation in the reports, which
has the support of the Commission as well as of the Task Force, is the
proposal that the Office of Legal Services and Procedure, which already
208. T.F. Rept. No. 60. The proposed Code provision [Code § 2 08(g)] spells out
that "authority" means "jurisdiction or authority," hence something more than jurisdic-
tion.
209. H.C. Rept. No. 48.
210. DAvis, ADIMNSTRA r E LAw 621-34. Cf. Fay v. Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.
1949).
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has been discussed in relation to the proposed career merit system for
government attorneys, should "assist agencies in simplifying, clarifying,
and making uniform rules of substance and procedure . . . insure agency
compliance with statutory public information requirements . . . and . . .
receive and investigate complaints regarding legal procedures and report
thereon to the authorities concerned." '21 1 The purpose of this function of
the Office might have been stated more broadly so as to include investi-
gation and reports with regard to the improvement of agency procedures;
but such is no doubt the intention. The Task Force report includes a
review of the series of proposals, beginning with that of the Attorney
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, for the establishment
of an office having this general function.212 Had these proposals been
acted upon, especially in the Administrative Procedure Act, the difficulties
still remaining with respect to federal administrative procedure might
have been greatly lessened.
It cannot be too strongly urged that, whatever else may be done or
not done as a result of the Commission and Task Force reports, the
establishment of an office of administrative procedure should be no
longer delayed. The substantial accomplishments of the President's Con-
ference on Administrative Procedure working on a temporary basis, are
indicative of what might be achieved by means of a permanent arrange-
ment. Although in the writer's view an independent office would be
greatly preferable to one in the Department of Justice, the objections
to performance of procedural functions by a unit in the Department of
Justice 21 are considerably less than those to the performance of govern-
ment-wide personnel functions there.
G. Limitations of Federal Administrative Authority
Certain recommendations which the reports contain with respect to
the bestowal and distribution of governmental authority are extremely
important from a political, and to some extent from a legal, standpoint;
but they can only be mentioned here. The Task Force in particular makes
highly restrictive recommendations in this regard and supports them
with reasoning which many will be unable to accept. "Duplicating and
overlapping jurisdiction between Federal and State agencies should be
211. H.C. Rept. No. 49; T.F. Rept. No. 61.
212. T.F. Rept., pp. 232-33. The Report of the President's Conference on Ad-
ministrative Procedure (1955) contains a recommendation similar to that in the present
reports.
213. The reasons why an independent office would be preferable are stated in two
successive annual reports of the Committee on Improvement of Administrative Pro-
cedures of the American Bar Association's Section of Administrative Law. See 7 AD.
LAW BULL. 240, 243-44 (1955) ; 6 id. 203-04 (1954).
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reduced to a minimum and entirely eliminated whenever possible by the
relinquishment of jurisdiction by Federal agencies to State agencies
which meet reasonable standards of regulation.""21 Broad standards to
guide administrative action, in statutes conferring administrative author-
ity, are also condemned, and the recommendation is made that such au-
thority "should be clearly and precisely stated in enabling legislation."21
When administrative authority has been conferred, "no sanction should
be imposed or substantive rule or order issued except within the letter,
purpose, and intent of applicable statutes and the limitations of agency
jurisdiction. '" 2  Agency rules and orders, moreover, "should be enforced
only within the literal, definite, and specific terms thereof, and should
not exceed the scope permissible upon the facts or record on which such
agency action is required to be made or sought to be justified.Y21 7
In support of its view that federal authority should yield to state
authority whenever possible, the Task Force argues that "the basic pur-
pose of Federal action should be to supplement and not to displace State
power."'2 8 This preference for state over federal authority has little
relation to the administrative and procedural problems with which the
Task Force primarily deals. The report of the Commission on this point,
expressing the views of the three members who joined in all of the
recommendations, is considerably more circumspect, contenting itself with.
emphasis upon the need for further study and elimination of conflicts.219
Obviously the matter is not going to be settled, or even much affected,
by what is said in a report on procedure.
The other restrictive recommendations relating to narrow confine-
ment of federal administrative power when conferred, would, if con-
scientiously applied, seriously impede effective regulation by the national
government. Heretofore remedial legislation has in general been con-
strued broadly to effectuate its purposes, unless specific countervailing
considerations dictated otherwise; and broad standards, permitting the
exercise of considerable discretion, have been thought proper as a means
of dealing with complex situations for which precise legislative prescrip-
tions are impracticable. Yet, under the recommendations, even such per-
ennial standards as "reasonable," "unreasonable," "public interest," "pub-
lic convenience and necessity," and "practicable" would be expected to
214. T.F. Rept. No. 23. Under T.F. Rept. No. 24, duplication and overlapping
among federal agencies would also be eliminated whenever possibl.e. See also H.C.
Rept. No. 29.
215. T.F. Rept. No. 25. See also H.C. Rept. No. 30.
216. T.F. Rept. No. 54. See also H.C. Rept. Nos. 30, 45.
217. T.F. Rept. No. 59.
218. T.F. Rept., p. 115.
219. H.C. Rept., p. 48.
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disappear."' There seems little likelihood that Congress will be able to
dispense with such terms; it may, however, be able to avoid legislation
entirely lacking in verbal standards, such as the Task Force also criticizes
with justification. Narrow interpretation of regulatory statutes, such as
the Task Force advocates, can be justified only if the public interest which
leads to legislation is to be regarded as uniformly subordiniate to meticu-
lous procedural protection to private interests. Enforced literalness in
regulations is also a counsel of perfection; for even government, with
all its use of words, can hardly be expected to verbalize in advance all of
its actions with precision, in the face of a complex and changing world.
2 2 1
H. Conclusion
It is apparent from the discussion in this review that the Commission
and Task Force reports not only serve as stimulants to comprehensive
consideration of the problems of administrative procedure and the legal
aspects of administrative organization, but also contain valuable pro-
posals for solving a considerable number of problems. The proposal for a
career merit system for government attorneys, the recommendations as
to regulation of the practice of law before government agencies, the pro-
posal for an administrative court, the endorsement of an office of ad-
ministartive procedure, and the recommendation that a special type of
personnel system for hearing officers should be established, all these,
together with certain specific suggestions as to agency procedures, contain
the seeds of noteworthy progress.
Inability on the part of the writer and others to accept many of the
recommendations, especially of the Task Force, results primarily from
disagreement with the Task Force's underlying belief that judicial pro-
cedure, both during agency operations themselves and in subsequent
judicial proceedings to challenge or review them, should be made avail-
able to the greatest possible extent to persons affected by agency actions.
The Task Force's belief has given rise to an additional recommendation,
to which the Commission, except for its dissenting member, lends quali-
fied support: "Judicial functions, such as the imposition of money penal-
ties, the remission or compromise of money penalties, the award of repar-
220. T.F. Rept., p. 134.
221. Case-by-case development of administrative policies would be largely pre-
vented by adoption of the Task Force's recommendation [T.F. Rept. No. 55; Code §
208(b)] that "no sanction should be imposed or substantive rule or order issued against
any person for pursuing a normal, customary, or previously acceptable course of con-
duct, unless such conduct shall have been proscribed or restricted by generally applicable
rule of the agency." Aside from the litigation it would breed, this provision would have
the harmful effect of reversing the sound reasoning of the majority of the Supreme
Court in Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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ations or damages, and the issuance of injunctive orders, should be
transferred to the courts wherever possible. 2' The Commission would
have Congress "look into the feasibility" of such a transfer of functions,
"wherever it may be done without harm to the regulatory process. 223
This recommendation of the Task Force stems from an over-all view-
point, expressed in the report, that an evolutionary process throughout
the Anglo-American legal history can be seen, whereby new governmental
functions are started under executive auspices, there is subsequent judi-
cialization by means of administrative tribunals, and then a final trans-
fer of the adjudicative aspects to the courts of law.2 This viewpoint
could be supported by reference to the origin of the English courts as
administrative bodies and is exemplified by the development of tax
tribunals in the federal system. Granted that such an evolution sometimes
takes place, it by no means follows that the process is a universal one
or that a counter-movement away from judicial tribunals through the
establishment of administrative remedies does not also take place. Such,
certainly, has been the modern history of railroad and public utility rate
regulation and of governmental efforts to deal with trade practices,
abuses in the marketing of securities, and protection to the consumers of
food products. The Task Force's philosophy therefore breaks down
as regards some of the most vital areas of administration with which the
reports attempt to deal. If the specific recommendation that the repara-
tions jurisidiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission be transferred
to the courts means that the very duality of authority in rate-fixing
which the primary jurisdiction doctrine22 was designed to avoid would be
reestablished, it seems definitely unsound for this reason too. The author-
ity to collect, remit, and compromise money penalties, on the other
hand, has on the whole not been handled well by administrative agencies, 228
and the substitution of judicial for administrative processes in performing
these functions would probably constitute an improvement.
The nub of a sound approach to many of the problems dealt with
in the reports is that, rather than attempt to follow a theory to its drily
logical conclusions, it would be better to base reforms upon realistic study
of particular problems, with general theory in the background rather
than in the foreground. The danger is that, given the predisposition to
favor judicial methods over administrative, which conventional opinion
222. T.F. Rept. No. 62.
223. H.C. Rept. No. 50.
224. T.F. Rept., pp. 239-42, 246-50.
225. DAvis, ADmINISTRATIVE LAw 664-73.
226. See Nelson, Administrative Blackmail: The Remission of Penalties, 4 VEST.
POL. Q. 610 (1951).
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shares with the Task Force, mistakes may be made in carrying out the
recommendations, which the nation will have cause to regret. The legal
profession also would suffer if such should be the course of events, be-
cause lawyers would have been so largely responsible. The task of the
profession now, as well as that of Congress, is to appraise the reports
carefully, make use of the best that is in them, and avoid being stampeded
into unwise action. The administrative process, far from being a passing
phenomenon, continues to be a principal reliance in solving both old and
new problems. It needs refinement rather than abolition.
